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A growing literature challenges the view that public banks are detrimental to economic growth
(Andrianova, Demetriades and Shortland 2011, Ang 2011, K¨ orner and Schnabel 2011).1 Andri-
anova et al. (2011), for example, provide new evidence suggesting that during 1995–2007 public
banks have been associated with higher growth rates. These results lend support to a modern
version of the ‘developmental’ view of public banks, made relevant by failures in corporate gov-
ernance and regulation. Such failures allowed private banks in developed countries to behave
opportunistically, aiming at maximizing short term trading proﬁts and relying on government
safety nets to cover hidden risks (Johnson 2009, Kane 2010).
The aim of this paper is to illustrate in a formal setting a plausible mechanism through which
public banks can play a growth-promoting role, even if such banks are less eﬃcient than private
banks. To this end, the paper puts forward a model of banking competition in which there are
two types of private bank—honest and opportunistic—alongside a public bank. It is assumed
that depositors cannot distinguish between honest and opportunistic banks. When regulation
is weak, opportunistic banks can take excessive risks with depositors’ money, by engaging in
socially unproductive speculation. These assumptions accord well with stylized facts surrounding
the recent ﬁnancial crisis, such as the compounding of agency problems by the invention of new
and complex ﬁnancial products, which were mainly designed to conceal large tail risk and to
enrich bankers in the good state of the world.2
The model builds on Andrianova, Demetriades and Shortland (2008), which introduces a
public bank into the “circular city” model of banking competition.3 The main novelty here is the
introduction of a speculative investment which represents a natural way to capture opportunistic
behavior by banks. In contrast, the kind of opportunism analyzed in Andrianova et al. (2008)
involves wildcat banking (banks optimally choosing whether to appropriate depositors’ money),
1Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (2001) and Karas, Schoors and Weill (2008) study the relative eﬃciency of
public banks.
2Private banks’ increased appetite for taking and concealing such risks to boost private rewards was documented
before the current crisis by Rajan (2005) and coined, post-crisis, “casino banking” by Bank of England Governor
Mervyn King.
3The model was developed by Salop (1979) and applied to banking by Freixas and Rochet (1997).
1a setting more relevant for transition.
2 Model
Private banks and a continuum of risk-neutral depositors are located along a circle of unitary
length. Depositors are uniformly distributed with unitary distribution density. A depositor incurs
transportation cost α > 0 which is proportional to the distance between the depositor and the
bank. In the centre of the circle, a public bank has been in existence for some time and as such
has equal appeal to all depositors.
The depositors are endowed with 1 unit of cash but do not have direct access to investment
opportunities, to earn a return they need to deposit their cash in a bank. The money collected
from private depositors can be invested into a safe technology with a constant rate of return
r. All banks, private and public, have access to this technology. A proportion γ ∈ (0, 1) of
private banks have, in addition, access to a risky technology (“gambling”) which returns R with
probability ρ ∈ (0, 1) or zero with probability 1 − ρ. These private banks are “opportunistic”
in contrast to the “honest” banks that have no access to gambling. An opportunist chooses
whether to invest safely or to gamble with depositors’ money.4 The type of private bank is
private information, while the value of γ is common knowledge.
Because of the riskiness of the gambling technology, an opportunistic bank fails to honour its
deposit contract whenever the realized return is zero. Gambling is socially unproductive: ρR < r.
As such, it is prohibited by the regulator: a private bank that chooses to gamble is found out
with probability λ and if additionally the positive return from gambling is realized, the bank is
ﬁned an amount f > 0 per deposit contract.5 Investments in the risky technology that return
zero are sunk. In such a case, depositors lose their deposit but with probability λ ∈ (0, 1) are
compensated by the amount 0 < d ≤ 1 through a deposit insurance scheme.6
4Alternatively, we can think of all banks having access to both technologies, but some (public and 1−γ proportion
of private banks) are prevented from “gambling” by stricter internal governance.
5If the realized gambling return is zero, the regulator is powerless to impose a ﬁne.
6The depositor compensation probability does not have to be the same as the bank punishment probability.
Nevertheless, as the two measure diﬀerent aspects of government eﬀectiveness, they are likely to be highly correlated
and in the model are treated both as λ for expositional convenience.
2The public bank oﬀers a net deposit rate of rs = r0
s − α/(2π) > 0 to all depositors. Private
banks are located anywhere along the circle with bank i oﬀering deposit rate ri (i = 1,...,n)
which is set so as to maximize proﬁts. There are potentially many identical private banks that
can enter the industry at a positive ﬁxed cost, F, and with free entry n banks will enter.
The timing of events is as follows.
(1) Private banks decide whether to enter; n banks enter.
(2) Private bank i (i = 1,...,n) sets its deposit rate ri.
(3) Each depositor chooses the bank in which to place the deposit of 1 monetary unit.
(4) Banks invest. Opportunistic banks choose whether to invest safely or to gamble.
(5) Investment returns are realized. Risky investments are discovered with probability λ.
(6) Payoﬀs are realized.
Let κ ∈ {0,1} represent an opportunist’s decision to invest safely (κ = 0) or to gamble (κ = 1).
The expected payoﬀs of the depositor located at distance xi from a private bank i and depositing
his money in bank i is
Ui = [1 − γκ(1 − ρ)] · (1 + ri) + γκ(1 − ρ)λd − αxi, (1)
where κ is set by the opportunist to maximize its proﬁts. If the depositor, instead, puts his money
into the public bank, then his payoﬀ is
Us = 1 + rs (2)
because every depositor is one radius away from the public bank. The expected payoﬀs of an
honest bank and an opportunistic bank are, respectively:
V
1−γ
i = (r − ri) · Di, (3)
V
γ
i = (1 − κ)(r − ri) · Di + κρ · [R − ri − λf] · Di. (4)
The public bank’s expected payoﬀ is V s = (r − r0
s) · Ds. There is an assumed bias against it:
Assumption 1 rs ≤ r − 3/2 ·
√
αF (A1)
3i.e. in the absence of gambling, a private bank is more eﬃcient than the public bank.
Assumption 2 αF > 1 and f > R−r (A2)
that is, the costs borne by private banks and depositors (set up and transportation) are higher
than an individual deposit, and also the punishment of a bank found by the regulator to have
gambled is higher than the excess return from gambling.7
3 Results and Discussion
Three types of (pure strategy) equilibria are possible in this model. “High” equilibrium (HE)
where there is no gambling by private banks and no demand for public banking; “intermediate”
equilibrium (IE) with both the public and private banks having positive demand for deposit
contracts, and “low” equilibrium (LE) where only public banking is demanded and no private
bank enters.
For expositional convenience, deﬁne the following bounds:
λg ≡














(1 − ρ)(1 − λd)γrs
1 − γ(1− ρ)
￿
(7)
Proposition 1 Assume (A1) and (A2). A unique equilibrium exists and it is of type:




F/α, and n =
p
α/F (i = 1,...,n);
(ii) IE, if λx ≤ λ < λg. Then ri = 1
2[r +
rs+γ(1−ρ)(1−λd)
2(1−γ(1−ρ)) ], Di = [r −rs −γ(1−ρ)(1+r −λd)]/α
and n < ˜ n (i = 1,...,n);
(iii) LE, if λ < min{λx,λg}. Then Di = 0 (i = 1,...,n), and n = 0.
7If the ﬁne for gambling is “small”, opportunists will ﬁnd it optimal to gamble even when likelihood of punishment
is high and that of positive return from gambling is small.
4Sketch of the proof: The model is solved by backward induction. Firstly, for a given
strategy of opportunistic banks, κ, depositor located at xi from private bank i picks the larger
between Us and Ui. Secondly, given the realized deposit demand, Di, measured as a distance
between bank i and a marginal depositor (for whom Us = Ui), honest bank i sets ri to maximize
proﬁts. An opportunistic bank j sets its rj to mimic ri of the honest bank so as to avoid revealing
its true type. Finally, for a given Di and ri, bank i decides whether to enter. Under (A1) and (A2),
the bounds on λ arise from (i) an opportunist’s calculation to gamble [V γ(κ = 1) > V γ(κ = 0) if
λ < λg], and (ii) depositor’s preference, or lack of it, for private banking [Ui|κ=0 > Us if λ > λx].
Remark 1 The depositors’ demand for private banking is greater when institutional quality, λ,
is higher and the proportion of opportunistic banks, γ, is lower.
This follows from part (ii) of the proposition, since in IE the demand for a private bank i, Di, is
an increasing function of λ and a decreasing function of γ.
Remark 2 When private and public banking co-exist, the productivity of capital is increasing
with institutional quality, decreasing with the proportion of opportunistic banks and (consequently)
increasing with the share of deposits in the public bank.
This followsfrom the observation that in IE, the only equilibrium in which there is positivedemand
for both private and public deposit contracts, the productivity of capital is inversely related to
the total capital invested in the speculative activity. The latter happens to be γ·n(γ,λ)·Di(γ,λ),
and it is rising with λ and falling with γ.
4 Concluding Remarks
These results have policy implications which are particularly relevant today when many banks
not only in developing but also in developed countries remain in state hands. They suggest that
unless ﬁnancial regulation can eﬀectively prevent speculative investments, privatization of public
banks may be detrimental. In terms of future research, these results suggest that it may be fruitful
to continue exploring models in which banks can behave opportunistically and default can be an
equilibrium phenomenon.
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